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The Link Between Human Rights and
Terrorism and Its Implications for the
Law of State Responsibility*
By JORDAN J. PAUST
Professor of Law, University of Houston. A.B. 1965, J..D.
1968, U. C.L.A.; LL.M. 1972, University of Virginia; J.S.D.
Candidate, Yale University.
An inescapable link between impermissible acts of terrorism and vi-
olations of human rights exists. Because of this link, when human rights
are protected, terrorism is necessarily set back.
At one level of understanding, it is clear that strategies of impermis-
sible terrorism necessarily involve violations of human rights law.1 For
this reason, all forms of impermissible terrorism involve conduct that is
already proscribed by international law, whether such conduct is en-
gaged in by private individuals or an official elite, for some private or
political purpose, or even in the name of the state. Indeed, the United
Nations has generally condemned "all acts of terrorism . . . in all its
forms, wherever and by whomever committed." 2 The United States Con-
* The following essay is based in part on a dinner speech delivered at the University of
Southern California Conference on Human Rights and Terrorism, March 20, 1987, a regional
meeting of the American Society of International Law.
1. See, eg., Bazyler, Capturing Terrorists in the 'Wild Blue Yonder. International Law
and the Achille Lauro and Libyan Aircraft Incidents. 8 WHrrrIER L. REv. 685, 688 (1986);
Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for For-
eign Violators of International Law Under the MhIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J.
INT'L L. 191, 194-95, 214, 216, 231, 250 (1983). See also Friedlander, Terrorism and Interna-
tional Law: What is Being Done?, 8 RTrr.-CAM. L.J. 383, 387-88 (1977); Note, Terrorism as a
Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 236, 243-44 (1982).
2. Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/17554 (Oct. 9, 1985) (on
behalf of the members of the Council, also endorsing the Secretary-General's statement of Oct.
8, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1565 (1985); Res. 579, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986); G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1986),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239 (1986); Paust, Terrorism and the International Law of War, 64 MIL
L. REv. 1, 21 (1974), reprinted in 14 REV. DE DROrr PENAL MIL. ET DE DROIT DE LA
GUERRE 13 (1975). See also 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Declaration] ("Every State has the duty to
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gress recently issued a similar proclamation.3
Additionally, one can recognize that an effective assurance of
human rights and significant use of civil and criminal sanctions against
their deprivation by governments and private perpetrators will bring an
end to terrorism. This realization is critical to an adequate strategy for
combating terrorism and it provides the key to a fuller understanding of
state responsibility with respect to terrorism.
At the most general level of responsibility, all signatories to the
United Nations Charter have a legal "duty to promote through joint and
separate action universal respect for and observance of human
rights.. . ."I As the International Court of Justice recognized in 1971, a
state that deprives individuals of fundamental human rights violates its
basic obligations under the United Nations Charter.' In its 1979 decision
on the illegality of Iranian complicity in the taking of United States hos-
tages, the Court declared: "Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their
freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hard-
ship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations as well as with the fundamental principles enunci-
ated in the Universal Declaration of Human Right;."6
During the trial of the same case, the United States rightly affirmed
that "[t]he existence of such fundamental rights for all human beings,
nationals and aliens alike, and the existence of a corresponding duty on
the part of every State to respect and observe them are now reflected,
inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and... other instruments defining basic human
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in ... terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commis-
sion of such acts .. ."; "no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate..
terrorist ... activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State
.... "); Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 191, 192, 202, 205 ("support for subversive or terrorist
armed activities within another State"), 209, 292(9), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986) [here-
inafter Nicaragua v. United States].
3. H.R. Con. Res. 228, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 6 & 19, 1985), §§ 1(1), 4(b), reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 1562, 1563-64 (1985); International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1985, Pub. L. 99-83 §§ 503, 505, 507-508, 558(4) (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1558, 1558.
59, 1562 (1985).
4. 1970 Declaration, supra note 2, at 121.
5. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South-Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 3, 57. Indeed, "a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant
violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter." Id. See also infra text at note 7.
6. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 1, 42, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 553, 573 (1980).
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rights." 7
The International Court recognized as early as 1970 that "all states
can be held to have a legal interest in" the "protection" of basic human
rights. Such rights are "obligations erga omnes" (owing by each state
and person to all persons)8; they are obligations to humankind and of
universal interest.9 When the state violates these obligations, or any
other obligation under international law, there is no immunity from
otherwise legitimate responsive action by or on behalf of the interna-
tional community. 10 With respect to article 2, paragraph 7 of the United
Nations Charter, such violations of international law, even those occur-
ring entirely within a particular state's territory, are not "matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a single state. Indeed,
human rights violations are matters of international concern over which
there is a universal jurisdictional competence.'1
The authoritative 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law confirms related principles of universal responsibility. It contains a
widely recognized prescription: "Every State has the duty to refrain
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil
strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activi-
ties within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts." 2
A similar prescription prohibits related attempts to "organize, assist, fo-
ment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activi-
ties."1" Additionally, the United Nations Secretariat has stated that a
punishable act by individuals should include the incitement, encourage-
7. Memorial of the United States before the International Court of Justice, id. at 71. A
similar approach was taken by the U.S. in its brief in Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980). See Paust, Human Righ" From Jurisprudential
Inquiry to Effective Litigation, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, 234-37, 244 (1981).
8. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 4, para. 32.
9. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 7, at 229, 233-37; Paust, supra note 1, at 211-15, 221-25.
10. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 221-47; Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to For-
eign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights Nonimmunity for Violations of International Law
Under the FS4, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49 (1985); Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The
Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other Critnes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 283, 284-85, 297-302 (1986) [hereinafter Aggression Against Authority]; Paust, A Sur-
vey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment, and Coop-
erative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 431 (1975) [hereinafter Possible Legal Responses].
See also Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2nd Cir. 1987),
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1375 (1987); Forti v. Suarez-Mason 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1544-47 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
11. See, e.g., supra note 10.
12. 1970 Declaration, supra note 2, at 121.
13. Id.
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ment, or toleration of activities designed to spread terror among the pop-
ulation of another state.' 4
These prescriptions have grown out of specific historical incidents.
For example, the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in
1934, which precipitated the effort to create the 1937 Convention on Ter-
rorism, led to a claim by Yugoslavia that Hungary "had been tolerating
irredentist activity within its territory directed against the former." As a
result, "the League [of Nations] Council adopted a resolution declaring it
the duty of every state to desist from encouraging or tolerating such
activity.' i5
These prescriptions are also supported by a long history of legal ex-
pectations, often categorized in terms of aggression or norms of interven-
tion. In its 1986 opinion in Nicaragua v. United States, the International
Court of Justice recognized that the 1970 Declaration "affords an indica-
tion of... opiniojuris as to customary international law" with respect to
each of these prescriptions. 6 It further recognized that the general prin-
ciple of nonintervention is customary. ' 7 More specifically, the Court
noted that "[t]he element of coercion, which ... forms the very essence
of prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an inter-
vention which uses force ... in the indirect form of support for subver-
sive or terrorist armed activities within another State.' 8
Supplementing these prescriptions is the principle of self-determina-
tion."' It is difficult for one state to support terrorist activity against
persons in another state without interfering with the political process of
the second state. To the extent that persons in the targeted state are
denied equal participation in their political process, they are denied par-
ticipation in the sharing of power and an authoritative process of "deter-
14. Paust, supra note 2, citing U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418, at 26 (1972).
15. B. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION
OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COERCION 230-31 (1968), citing Kuhn, The Complaint
of Yugoslavia Against Hungary with Reference to the Assassination of King Alexander, 29 AM,
J. INT'L L. 87 (1935).
16. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 191.
17. Id. at 93, para. 174; 96-97, para. 181; 100-02, paras. 191-192; 106, para. 202; 109-10,
para. 209; 146, para. 292(3); 147-48.
18. Id. at 108, para. 205. The draft restatement recognizes that prohibitions of the threat
or use of force under article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter are customary. See RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REvisED) § 905 comment g (Ten-
tative Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT].
19. For general guidance, see, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2); 1970 Declaration, supra note
2; SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS (Y. Alexander
& R. Friedlander eds. 1980); Chen, Self-Determination as a Hu.'nan Right, in TOWARD
WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976).
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ruination" by an aggregate "self.' 20 This is necessarily true even when
state-sponsored terrorism in another state supports the majority of per-
sons in the targeted state, since the process of terrorism will deny dissent-
ing individuals the human right to participate in the political process and
in the formation of an aggregate "will of the people" of such a state.21
Thus, terrorism, as a strategy to coerce others through violence," of-
fends not only the free choice of the whole people, but also the freedom
and dignity of the individual. A state that engages in such conduct
against its own people or that wilfully organizes, instigates, assists, fi-
nances, incites, participates in, or tolerates such activity from within its
own borders against another state impairs the free choice of a people and
violates its obligation under the United Nations Charter. It is engaged,
however indirectly, in a process of political oppression that, however
widespread, complete, or temporal, will involve acts of politicide, or the
killing of political self-determination.' 3
Such a state is necessarily engaged, either directly or indirectly, as
an accomplice in conduct violating the human rights of persons to freely
participate in the political process and to have an authoritative govern-
ment that represents the "will of the people."'24 Thus, such a state is
violating its general obligations under the United Nations Charter to re-
spect and observe human rights. To the extent that the state or its agents
also engage in a threat or the use of force as part of such a strategy, the
state is necessarily violating the United Nations Charter. Article 2, para-
graph 4 of the Charter prohibits states from employing "the threat or use
of force against ... [the] political independence" of another state "or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions.' 5 Clearly, such a threat or use of force is "inconsistent with" and
thwarts both the precept of self-determination and the obligation of
20. See, eg., Aggression Against Authority, supra note 10, at 288-90; Possible Legal Re-
sponses, supra note 10, at 460-61.
21. See supra note 20. See also Paust, Authority: From a Human Rights Perspective, 28
AM. J. JURIS. 64 (1983).
22. For a useful, neutral definitional approach to terrorism, see Paust, supra note 1, at
192-94, 251; Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN.
L. REy. 697, 700-05 (1987). Thus defined, "terrorism" means any intentional use of violence
or a threat of violence against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary
target a threat of future violence to coerce the primary target through intense fear or anxiety in
connection with a demanded political outcome.
23. The only possible defense for such action would involve self-determination assistance
to people under attack from their own government. See, eg., Aggression Against Authority,
supra note 10, at 287-90, 292-98.
24. See, eg., id.; supra note 21; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res.
217A, 3 U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, reprinted in 1946-1947 U.N.Y.B. 831.
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states to respect and observe human rights.26
For this reason, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law affirms the Charter's prohibition of "any forcible action" by a state
that "deprives peoples . . . of their fight to self-determination" or that
supports "terrorist acts in another state." Similarly, the 1974 Definition
of Aggression by the General Assembly reaffirms "the duty of States not
to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determina-
tion."27 Such a use of force constitutes an aggression not only against the
process of self-determination, but also against authority and human
rights. When it includes strategies of terror, such a use of force consti-
tutes one of the more egregious forms of politicide, seeking to destroy a
governmental process that is based on the authority of the people as
guaranteed in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.21
Even when a state does not itself engage in acts of terrorism or spon-
sor such acts directly (for example, by wilfully organizing, instigating,
assisting, financing, inciting, or participating in such acts), state responsi-
bility exists under international law for "acquiescing in" or "tolerating"
terrorist activities by private individuals or groups directed against an-
other state.29 Not only was this general obligation reaffirmed in a 1986
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on terrorism, but the
General Assembly also noted the need for states to take all appropriate
measures to prevent "the preparation and organization in their respective
territories of acts directed against other States."30
The only formal challenge to these principles of state responsibility
may have occurred in two dubious rulings of the International Court in
the 1986 case of Nicaragua v. United States.31 Fi:rst, while addressing
alleged violations of human rights by the Contras, the Court correctly
noted that United States participation in Contra operations would not in
itself prove that such violations are attributable to the United States.3 2
However, the Court wrongly opined that for the United States to have
"legal responsibility" it was necessary to prove that the United States
"had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the
course of which the alleged violations were committed."33 The Court
26. See, e.g., Aggression Against Authority, supra note 10, at 287-89.
27. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 Annex (preamble), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975); supra note 18.
28. See supra note 24.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13, 18.
30. G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 2, at para. 5.
31. 1986 I.C.J. 14.
32. Id. at 64, para. 115.
33. Id. at 65, para. 115; 113, para. 216; 129, para. 254.
(Vol. I11
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was addressing an example of direct responsibility through effective con-
trol of armed units. It ignored the fact that even prior to Nuremberg it
was recognized that a state and its actors could be held responsible for
"acquiescence, .... tolerance," or complicity. 4
Second, while addressing implications of the acts of the United
States in supplying a 1983 guerrilla manual to the Contras, the Court
concluded that such action "encouraged the commission... of acts con-
trary to general principles of the humanitarian law" documented in the
Geneva Conventions,.5 and noted that the United States is "under an
obligation not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in
Nicaragua to act in violation of" the Geneva Conventions.36 While the
Court found that such impermissible encouragement did exist and that
relevant violations of Geneva law were thus foreseeable, 7 it did "not find
a basis for concluding" that any violations of Geneva law by the Contras
"are imputable to the United States... as acts of the United States."3 8
While the Court was reluctant to fasten legal responsibility in the
United States, it may still have been the intent of the Court to recognize a
responsibility of the United States for its conduct of encouragement.
Certainly, states can be guilty of "encouragement" of, "toleration" of, or
"acquiescence" in violations of international law. The complicity of the
state is proscribed whether or not other violations of international law
can be "imputed" to the state. Indeed, general norms of customary in-
ternational law proscribe state encouragement or toleration of terrorist
and subversive acts by private persons directed against the legitimate
government of another state.39
Since the early history of the United States, legislation has existed to
fulfill such customary obligations. There have been, and continue to be,
prosecutions of individuals for breach of neutrality laws and interrelated
34. See generally Paust, supra note 1, at 227; Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths
and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. R. 99, 156-59, 166-69 (1972). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 12-13, 18, 29; infra notes 43, 48. With respect to U.S. involvement in foreign state
illegality, see Paust, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial Federal Poser Persons,
Property, Due Process; and the Seizure of Evidence Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 449, 467-76 (V. Nanda & M. Bassiouni
eds. 1987).
35. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 148, para. 292(9) (vote: 14-1, Judge Schwe-
bel in favor).
36. Id. at 114, para. 220; 129, para. 255.
37. Id. at 129-30, paras. 255-256; supra note 35.
38. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. at 148, para. 292(9).
39. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 12, 13, 15-18, 23, 30; infra text accompanying
notes 47-49.
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violations of the law of nations.4" In this sense, a prosecution of Oliver
North and others involved in Contragate, whether or not their acts were
actually authorized by the President,4" would hardly be unprecedented.
When territorial rights are involved, the United States has always recog-
nized that private violations of the law of nations can constitute an act of
"aggression" and a crime against "peace. '42 Both in Henfield's Case in
1793 and in an opinion of the Attorney General in 1795, it was recog-
nized that individuals are subject to punishment for "committing, aiding
or abetting hostilities."43 Thus, the selling of "war bonds" or the fur-
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982) (formerly id. § 25 (1940)); notes 41-48 infra. See also
United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 51-3 (1897) (the Neutrality Act was enacted to
assure U.S. compliance with the law of nations). See also The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Crunch)
170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 40-41 (1801); has v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
37 (1800); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 156 (Paterson, J.: "These acts were direct
and daring violations of the principles of neutrality, and highly criminal by the law of na-
tions.") (Iredell, J.) (1795).
41. See United States v. Black, 685 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021
(1982); Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1452-53 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (federal officials cov-
ered by this section), rev'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs lck
standing); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1228-31 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342);
Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers
in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1983); Note, The Iran-Contra Affair,
the Neutrality Act, and the Statutory Definition of "'At Peace," 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1987);
Note, Nonenforcement of the Neutrality Act: International Law and Foreign Policy Powers
Under the Constitution, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1955 (1982); C. Stone, "Original Intent" and Fol-
lowing Orders-A Framer of Constitution Set Issue Straight for Early-Day Ollie, L.A. Times,
July 22, 1987, § II, at 5, col. 3. With respect to executive responsibility to obey international
law and not usurp Congressional power, see Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law
of the Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
719 (1982); Paust, The President Is Bound By International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L, 377
(1987).
Curiously, a pardon of Oliver North and others would only increase U.S. liability under
the precept of "denial of justice" with respect to aliens injured by such breaches of neutrality
law. See, e.g., In re Janes, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 82, 87 ("especially so if the Government has
permitted the guilty parties to escape or has remitted the punishment by granting either par-
don or amnesty"), 90, 96 (" 'well-established principle ... that, by pardoning a criminal, a
nation assumes the responsibility for his past acts'," quoting In re Cotesworth & Powell (GB.
v. Colom.), in J. MOORE, 2 INTERNATIONAL ARIITRATIONS 2050, 2085 (1898)) (1925);
DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 711 reporter's note 2B, citing In re West, Opinions
of the Commissioners 404 (Mexican-American Claims Comm'n 1926-1927) (pardon or am-
nesty). A pardon would seem to be legally improper. See Paust, Contragate and the Invalidity
of Pardons of Violations of International Law, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 51 (1987).
42. Henfield's Case, I 1 F. Cas. at 1108-45 (Wilson, J., charge to grand jury and indict-
ment), 117 (points of Rawle, dist. att'y, regarding the defendant's "aggression" on them; "ac-
tual aggression is charged"). Accord 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) ("the peace of Mankind");
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) ("against the public peace").
43. Henfield's Case, II F. Cas. 1099 passim; I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). The prohibi-
tion of involvement remains. See supra note 34. Given such historic prohibition, it follows that
prosecution for complicity is possible under the Neutrality Act, See also 18 U.S.C. § 2; Jacob-
[Vol, 11
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nishing of money for such purposes is certainly prohibited.'
In 1794 Congress passed neutrality legislation45 to provide criminal
sanctions for such offenses against the law of nations. In 1797 an opinion
of the Attorney General also recognized that a "violation of territorial
rights" is "an offense against the law of nations, and of a nature very
serious in its consequences."' 4 The Attorney General added: "That the
peace of mankind may be preserved, it is the interest as well as the duty
of every government to punish with becoming severity all the individuals
of the state who commit this offense."'47 Further, Justice Wilson recog-
nized in Henfield's Case that "[w]hen the offending citizen escapes into
his own country, his nation should oblige him to repair the damage, if
reparation can be made, or should punish him.... If the nation refuse to
do either, it renders itself in some measure an accomplice in the guilt,
and becomes responsible for the injury."48
Because of its recognition of state responsibility under customary
sen v. United States, 272 F. 399 (C.C.A. I1. 1921), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 703 (1921); United
States v. Ram Chandra, 254 F. 635 (D.C. Cal. 1917); United States v. Tauscher, 233 F. 597
(D.C.N.Y. 1916) (conspiracy).
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 960 (1982).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 25 (1940) (current version at id. § 960 (1982)).
46. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797). See supra note 40.
47. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 68, 69 (1797). See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay) ("Ilt is of high
importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations.").
48. 11 F. Cas. at 1108. Nearly the same language is found in later arbitral awards. See,
e-g., In re Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 82, 96 (1925) ("by its failure to make
reparation or punish the guilty... rendered itself 'in some measure an accomplice in the
injury' and has become 'responsible for it.' "), quoting In re Poggioli, Ralston Report at 869
(Italian-Venezuelan Comm'n 1903). See id. at 86 (recognizing that other awards had been
based on "a derivative liability, assuming the character of some kind of complicity"), 87
("complicity"), 94 (" 'se rend comme complice .... se rend en quelque facon complice de
l'injure et en devient responsable,"' quoting I. PRADIER-FODERE, 1 TnArr DE DROrr IN-
TERNATIONAL PUBLIC 336 (1885), trans. in n.l: "renders itself an accomplice ... is in a
manner making himself an accessory to the injury and becomes responsible therefor"), 95
(" 'may be regarded as virtually a sharer in the injury and as responsible therefor' " quoting J.
MOORE, 6 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEsT 655 (1906)). Moreover, the decision contains sev-
eral references to other arbitral decisions of text-writers from the 18th to 20th centuries recog-
nizing state responsibility for a "denial of justice" by failing to allow full reparation or to
punish the guilty. See id at 86-91, 94-97. On this point, see also infra notes 54, 63. The
earliest reference is to E. DE VATrEL, 2 THE LAW OF NATIONS 161-62 (1758), whose language
was quite similar to that used by Justice Wilson in Henfield's Case. See id. at 95; 11 F. Cas. at
1108. More generally, state responsibility was recognized in United States v. Arjona as follows:
The law of nations requires every national government to use "due diligence" to
prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation with which it
is at peace, or the people thereof; and because of this the obligation of one nation to
punish those who within its own jurisdiction counterfeit the money of another nation
has long been recognized.
120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887).
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international law, the Continental Congress resolved in 1781 that our
states should allow the United States to sue "offending citizens" in state
courts.49 A United States Attorney General later argued, in a case in-
volving other violations, that although "[ilt is true, by the law of nations,
if the citizens of one State do an injury to the citizens of another, the
government of the offending subject ought to take every reasonable mea-
sure to cause reparation to be made by the offender, ... if the offender is
subject to the ordinary processes of law, it is believed this principle does
not generally extend to oblige the government to make satisfac-
tion .... ,0 By the time of this opinion in 1802, the Alien Tort Statute3 '
of 1789 had been enacted in part to meet such responsibility, and an
opinion of the Attorney General in 1795 had aptly recognized that with
respect to private "acts of hostility committed by American citizens...
the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostil-
ity have a remedy by civil suit in the courts of the United States."52
These early cases and events stand in stark contrast to many of the as-
sumptions of Judges Edwards and Bork in the more recent Tel-Oren
case.
53
More generally, it was recognized by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist that our courts must be made available to foreign litigants and
that a "denial or perversion of justice" by a judicial denial of standing or
remedy can subject the United States to liability.54 Today, when human
49. 21 J. Cont. Cong. 1137 (1781). See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907) ("The United
States owes the duty and has the right of vindicating the treaty. It can hardly be doubted that
... the United States may proceed by bill in equity to obtain an injunction, and.., mandatory
relief ... ."); Penhallow v. Doane's Admin., 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 83 (1975) (Paterson, J.),
quoting Con. Res. of Mar. 6, 1779 (Congress as opposed to states is to control by appeal and
"decide on all matters and questions touching the law of nations ... to compel a just and
uniform execution of the law of nations," and not to "disable the Congress ... from giving
satisfaction to foreign nations complaining of a violation of neutralities, of treaties, of other
breaches of the law of nations.").
50. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 106, 107 (1802). See supra note 48; infra notes 54-55.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
52. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). See also M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas, 128, 128
(D.C.D.S.C. 1794) (No. 8,810) ("If an alien sue here for a tort under the law of nations or a
treaty ... the suit will be sustained."). See infra. note 53.
53. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 811 (1985); J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts In U,S,
History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter On Human Rights]. See Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the
Comments, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81, 83-91, 94, 99 & n.123 (1981); 79 PRoc., AM. Soc. INT'L L,
362-66 (1985) (remarks); id. at 367 (remarks of Prof. Newman); id. at 376 (remarks of Prof.
McDougal).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 80. See supra note 48; In re Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 82, 87 (1925) ("would have had an opportunity of subjecting the murderer to a
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rights are at stake, as they are with respect to nearly all acts of terrorism,
the nation-state has a fundamental obligation to provide a judicial forum
for the private victim of impermissible terrorism and to guarantee such
individuals the right of an effective remedy."5 Such an obligation is tied
to general human rights obligations under the United Nations Charter,
as supplemented by customary law and the authoritative Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights.56 In the case of human rights violations con-
nected with acts of terrorism, there are additional reasons why a state's
"denial of justice" and of an effective remedy in domestic courts may be
inconsistent with state responsibility. In a given case, such a denial
might also involve an impermissible "assistance" to, "acquiescence" in,
"encouragement" of, or "toleration" of such terrorist conduct, for which
there is independent state responsibility.
For these same reasons, a refusal by a state to prosecute or extradite
an alleged international terrorist can implicate the same form of state
responsibility. Several multilateral treaties also proscribe particular
forms of terrorism and set forth independent requirements that all rea-
sonably accused violators found within a signatory state be taken into
custody and subjected to prosecution or extradition.57 Further, custom-
ary international law implicates the same sort of responsibility of the
state with respect to criminally sanctionable violations of customary in-
ternational law.58 For example, in 1971 the United Nations General As-
sembly affirmed "that a refusal by States to co-operate in the arrest,
extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and
crimes against humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and to generally recognized norms of in-
ternational law."59 The United States Attorney General had recognized
as early as 1821 that with respect to "crimes against mankind" the state
civil suit"), 94 ("refuses to repair the damage"), 95 ("must compel the offender to make
amends"), 96 ("the criterion suggested by Bonfils was exactly met by the administrative refusal
to grant relief," "failure to make reparation," "refusal to provide means of reparation when
such means are possible; or from its pardon of the offender, when such pardon necessarily
deprives the injured party of all redress").
55. See generally On Human Rights, supra note 53; DRAFT RESTAT.,ENT, supra note
18, at 495 comment a to § 711, 500 comment e, 506 reporter's note 2; 79 PROC., AM. Soc.
INT'L LAW 362-66 (1985) (remarks).
56. U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56; Universal Declaration, supra note 24,
art. 8; supra note 55.
57. See, eg., Paust, supra note 1, at 195 & n.15, 227-29; Paust, Extradition and United
States Prosecution of the Achille Lauro Hostage-Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20 VAND. J.
TRANS. L. 235, 237-40 (1987).
58. See supra note 57.
59. G.A. Res. 2840, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
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"in which the guilty person lives ought not ... obstruct" the right of an
injured state to punish the perpetrator. 6° A state need not "sponsor"
such forms of criminal conduct in order to imply an independent basis
for state responsibility. The general obligation to arrest and prosecute or
extradite the international criminal takes on added significance when it is
recognized that the 1986 resolution of the General Assembly on terror-
ism "[u]nequivocally [condemned] . . . , as criminal, all acts, methods
and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed .... ,61
Even more broad is the formal affirmation by the Security Council
in 1985 of an "obligation of all States in whose territory hostages or ab-
ducted persons are held urgently to take all appropriate measures to se-
cure their safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of hostage-
taking and abduction in the future.",62 Such an obligation is clearly be-
yond prohibitions of state sponsorship or tolerance of hostage-taking and
abduction. Even an innocent state not initially involved in the illegality
can become responsible for its failure to act to secure the release of such
persons or to prevent illegal conduct in the future. It does not matter
how widespread or rare the illegal acts are once the state is on notice of
such improprieties.
The obligation identified by the Security Council is not unlike the
customary prohibition of a "denial of justice" by states in whose territory
an offender is found or an offense is about to occur, 63 nor is it unlike the
more general obligation noted previously of all states to take action in
order to ensure a universal respect for and observance of fundamental
human rights. (Indeed, human rights and the precept of denial of justice
have often had a close interrelationship in the last two hundred years.'")
60. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 513 (1821).
61. G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 2, at para. 1.
62. Res. 579, supra note 2, at para. 3.
63. See, e.g., Yates, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in the Postwar
Era, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 213, 231-
35 (R. Lillich ed. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW O TilE
UNITED STATES § 183 (1965); DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at 505-06 reporter's note
2 to § 711 (failure to protect and failure to punish); In re Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 82, 86-87, 89-91, 94-97 (1925) (failure to apprehend and punish); In re Swinney (U,S,
v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 98, 100-01 (1926); In re Quintanilla (Mex. v. U,S,), 4 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 101, 102-03 (1926); In re Youmans (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 110,
115 (1926); In re Connolly (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 387, 388 (1928), In re East
(U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 646, 648-50 (1930); In re Mead (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.
Int'l Arab. Awards 653, 656-57 (1930). See also Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibilityfor
Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1977); Wise, Note
on International Standards of Criminal Law and Administration, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 135, 152-59 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965).
64. See, e.g., On Human Rights, supra note 53. See also Report of the Committee on
[Vol, I11
Terrorism and the Law of State Responsibility
Thus, when an offender is found in its territory, a state must permit civil
and criminal sanctions, or extradite the offender to a country willing and
able to prosecute. When a government knows, or should know, that an
offense of hostage-taking or abduction of an alien is about to occur and
such a government takes no reasonably available preventive action, liabil-
ity for "denial of justice" is appropriate.65
With respect to claims of denial of justice, some early decisions re-
quired evidence that local officials failed to administer the law in bad
faith or wilful neglect, or that official action was so far short of interna-
tional standards to be reasonably apparent.66 The Security Council,
however, has recognized a lower threshold for state responsibility, pre-
sumably on the basis of general international standards.67 In fact, since
World War II, state responsibility under the precept of "denial of jus-
tice" has been found to exist if the state fails to protect an alien from
criminal acts of others when it has had an opportunity to do so through
reasonably available means. As commentators affirm, the state can be
responsible "if its protection of aliens is unreasonably deficient under the
circumstances, [or] if it fails to take appropriate action to pursue and
punish those responsible."68 The United Nations has made claims
against nation-states on both such grounds.69
Note also that special obligations to prevent acts of terrorism, to
enact necessary implementing legislation, to promote cooperative investi-
gation and prosecution efforts when offenses have occurred, and to
render other forms of assistance are contained in several relevant trea-
ties.70 Such trends in prescription increasingly create a web of state re-
sponsibility that should prove useful in preventing some acts of terrorism
Human Rights of the American Branch of the International Law Association, Human Rights
Law, the U.S. Constitution and Methods of Judicial Incorporation, 1983-1984 PROC. 56; M.
McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND VORLD PUBLIC ORDER 739-
40 (1980); Lillich, supra note 63, at 26-29; Fenwick, The Progress of International Law During
the Past Forty Years, 79 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 44 (1951).
65. See supra note 63. See also In re Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 82, 95
(1925) ("prevalence of lawlessness and the inertness or powerlessness of the authorities near
the scene"). In In re Quintanilla (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 101 (1926), it was
recognized that if prisoners or hostages are taken into governmental custody, the government
must "account for them" and "can not exculpate itself" because "thereafter they have disap-
peared" or been found killed. Id. at 103.
66. See, e.g., Neer & Neer (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 60,
para. 4 (Gen. Claims Comm. 1926) Cf supra notes 63, 65.
67. See supra text accompanying note 62.
68. Yates, supra note 63, at 232. See also id. at 231-35; supra notes 48, 54, 63, 65.
69. Yates, supra note 63, at 233-34.
70. See, e.g., Possible Legal Responses, supra note 10, at 445-52, 454-58; Paust, supra note
1, at 195.
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and in responding to others after they have occurred. Most of these trea-
ties stress criminal sanctions; civil sanctions are also possible and can
provide a most useful addition to overall efforts to control and combat
terrorism. Moreover, the obligation of nation-states to provide effective
judicial remedies is customary and a part of fundamental human rights
law. Civil sanctions are thus a necessary addition to governmental efforts
to counter terrorism, and they can be employed by the judiciary in cases
otherwise properly before the courts.
Finally, in this bicentennial year, it seems more than appropriate to
recall words from Justice Wilson's charge to a grand jury at Richmond,
Virginia in 1793. These words reflect expectations of the Founders con-
cerning both state and individual responsibility:
To this universal society [of the human race] it is a duty that each
nation should contribute to the welfare, the perfection and the happi-
ness of the others .... The first degree of this duty is to do no injury.
Among states as well as among men, justice is a sacred law .... On
states as well as individuals the duties of humanity are strictly incum-
bent; what each is obliged to perform for others, from others it is enti-
tled to receive.7 '
71. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1107.
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